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If a subcontractor cannot recover as a third party beneficiary under
a contractor's bond because it contains no provision for his benefit, a
fortiori, he cannot recover under such a contract without bond for the
same reason. The general rule is that where a contract for public work
has been let without obtaining from the contractor the statutory bond,
there is no liability to the subcontractor.16 Since the contract between
the state and the prime contractor contained no express provision for
the benefit of the subcontractor, the court in the principal case
correctly decided that the subcontractor was not a third party bene-
ficiary. For this reason, the subcontractors action fails, and not, as
suggested in the Arkansas case, because of the absence of an existing
obligation to him at the time the prime contract was executed.
Tommy W. Chandler
CoNsTrrrtroNAL LAw-STATE ACroN-BEAL ESTATE DrscRnvnNATIoN.
-Real estate brokers in Detroit brought action to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a rule of the Michigan Corporation and Securities Commis-
sion,1 which prohibited discrimination by real estate brokers, sales-
men, and agents because of race, color, religion, ethnic origin or
ancestry.2 The commission is authorized by the legislature to revoke
a real estate broker's license for dishonest and unfair dealings and to
enumerate additional grounds of such conduct and "make rules in
harmony with the subject matter legislated upon."4
The basis of the action is that the commission had exceeded its
rule-making power. The Commission and amici curiae 5 contended that,
because of the vital importance to the state of the functions performed
by the licensed real estate brokers, discrimination on the basis of race,
color, creed or ancestry constitutes discriminatory state action in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment by not affirmatively prohibiting
such practice. The circuit court decreed the injunction sought and the
16 Annot., 64 A.L.R. 678 (1929).
1 For a discussion of the rule which is the subject of this litigation, see
Kinsey, Rule Nine-A Novel Approach?, 39 U. Det. L.J. 108 (1961).
2 The commission is vested with responsibility for enforcing provisions of the
Michigan statute which regulates licensed real estate agents and brokers.
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.794 (1959).3 Mich. Stat. Ann. § 19.794 (1959).
4 Ranke v. Corporation and Securities Commission, 317 Mich. 304, 26 N.W.2d
898 (1947).5 American Jewish Congress, American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, American Jewish
Committee, and the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith.
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commission appealed. Held: Affirmed. "Unfair dealing" is not norm-
ally conceived to include discrimination, but rather is intended to mean
no more than good reputation for honesty and fair dealing. The
delegation of power to make such a rule would be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to an executive agency. The failure
of the state to affirmatively prohibit discriminatory practices does not
constitute state action as prohibited by the fourteenth amendment.
McKibbon v. Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission, 119
N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1963).
In reaching its decision, the court dealt primarily with the delega-
tion of rule-making power to the defendant commission. By utilizing
the term "unfair dealing" as the foundation for making Rule 9, the
commission had gone beyond what the court felt was the legislative
intent of the statute delegating its rule-making power. "Unfair deal-
ing" was held to mean no more than "good reputation for honesty and
fair dealing" and was not so broad as to include the subject matter
of the rule in question.0 Even if the term "unfair dealing" were con-
strued as to cover the behavior forbidden by the rule, it would
amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers in
violation of article 4 of the Michigan constitution.
7
The right of the commission to revoke or suspend the license of a
real estate agent for failure to submit to his customer all offers
received is not involved in this decision. The court accepted as
contrary to the laws of agency a unilateral assumption of right on the
part of a real estate agent to determine suitability of a prospective
purchaser." Rule 9, however, was construed as covering discrimination,
whether or not such was directed by the client.9 This would be, in
effect, denying a private seller the services of a real estate agent if he
should wish to discriminate in entertaining offers.
It was the contention of the amici curiae that a eral estate agent
should not be part of a discriminatory transaction, and that the state
is guilty of discriminatory state action in violation of the fourteenth
amendment if it fails to forbid his participation. The amici rely heavily
on the recent case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority'0 and
the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Garner v. Louisiana."
The Burton case was concerned with the question of whether the
failure of a governmental body to expressly prohibit discrimination in
6 119 N.W.2d 557, 561 (1963).
7 Id. at 563.
8 Id. at 558.
9 ibid.
103 65 U.S. 715 (1961).
11368 U.S. 157 (1961).
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a lease of space to a restaurant in a publicly owned building con-
stituted state action. The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision
of the Delaware Supreme Court, supported the opinion with the
proposition that, since a large percentage of the income in the parking
authority enterprise was derived from leases of space to private con-
cerns within the building, the state was placed in a position of eco-
nomic interdependence with the private restaurant. Discrimination
by the restaurant in refusing to serve Negroes was, therefore, state
action as prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. Garner v. Louisi-
ana was a case in which Garner had been convicted of breach of the
peace as a result of a nonviolent lunch counter sit-in. The majority
opinion, in reversing, held that Garner had been denied due process
of law. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred with the result on other
grounds. Though private enterprises, reasoned Mr. Douglas, restaurants
are public facilities in which the states may not enforce a state policy
and custom of segregation. Restaurants have "public consequence"
and affect the community at large.12 The Michigan court distinguished
Garner on the grounds that, while the state was enforcing a Louisiana
policy of segregation, Michigan has no such policy or custom. Mich-
igan has, in fact, a manifested legislative policy against discrimi-
nation.'3
The amici curiae contended that failure of the state to forbid its
licensed real estate agents from engaging in transactions involving
discriminatory conduct would amount to discrimination by the state
and, therefore, violate the fourteenth amendment. The equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment is directed to the states and
not to private individuals.14 The amici argued that not only can the
state not actively discriminate, but that it must affiatively take action
to prevent discrimination by real estate agents and deny their services
to private sellers who practice discrimination.
The states are told by the fourteenth amendment what they must
not do, not what they must do.15 Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Civil
Rights Cases,'0 stated:
The wrongful act of an individual unsupported by any such authority
[by the state] is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual,
an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true whether they
121d. at 183.
1
3 E.g., Mich. State Fair Employment Practices Act, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.458
(160); Equal Accomodations Act, Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.343 (1962).
'4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
15 Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes For A Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 473, 479 (1962).
10 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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affect his person, property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in
some way by the state, or not done under state authority, his rights re-
main in full force .... 17
This traditional concept of state action, however, has been expand-
ing. In 1948, the Court, in the case of Shelley v. Kraemer,'8 held that
enforcement by state courts of contracts restricting the sale of property
to certain races was state action. The Supreme Court, in Barrows v.
Jackson,9 in 1953, held that the awarding of damages for breach of
such contracts similarly constituted state action. Administrative action
of a city board of trustees carrying out the provisions of a will which
established a school, to be operated by the city, for "poor white
orphans" was held to be state action.
20
In the area of inaction amounting to state action, the concept was
further broadened by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Burton
case. The failure of the state to forbid discrimination by its lessee was
a violation of the fourteenth amendment. The earlier cases in this area
had been generally limited to situations involving a public official's
refusal or culpable failure to perform his duties.21 Usually, the cases
holding inaction by the state as amounting to forbidden state action
have been restricted to this type of situation. The interdependence
of enterprises in the Burton case weighed heavily in the Supreme
Court's decision. It was felt by the court in Michigan, in distinguishing
Burton, that the Supreme Court has been expanding the concept of
state action, but not to the extent of the facts of the McKibbon case
nor "has even intimated it could do so."22
In considering a problem such as is presented in the McKibbon
case, the court must look beyond a technical mold and carefully
consider the delicate balance of interests involved. The freedom to
make private contracts and the freedom to use and enjoy property are
precious rights, as is the right to be free from discrimination.23 It has
been said that the notion of state action is useful in dividing the
responsibilities of the state and federal governments.24 In this age,
however, of ever expanding state and federal influence, the question
17 Id. at 17.
18 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
19856 U.S. 249 (1953).2 0 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of the City Trusts of the City of
Philadelphia, 350 U.S. 230 (1957).2 Lynch v. U.S., 189 F.2d 476 (1951); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,
151 F.2d 240 (1945); Catlette v. U.S., 132 F.2d 902 (1943).22 McKibon v. Michigan Corporation and Securities Commission, supra note
6 at 566.23 In O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, 365 P.2d 1
(Wash. 1961), it was held that an anti-discrimination statute violated the rights
of the property seller.24 Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 1083, 1121 (1960).
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of whether state action is involved becomes a very close and crucial
delineation. Federal Housing Administration home loans, urban re-
newal, the licensing of real estate agents by the state, building codes,
and zoning ordinances are but a few facets of public dominion in the
field of housing alone. The using of state action as the ultimate test is
becoming, at the least, somewhat tenuous, since it is possible to find
state action in a case such as this by seizing on the licensing aspect
only. By balancing the interests involved, the court determines
whether there is or is not state action to the extent thus far determined
by the Supreme Court as being in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment and reaches a desired result.
Donald S. Muir
CanumAL PRocEDun - EvmENcE - Wu=APPnG - ADmissmILrrY N
STATE CouRTs.-Defendant's conversation with the prosecuting witness
was recorded by an officer who attached a tape recorder microphone
to the witness' telephone receiver. The recording was made with the
aid and consent of the prosecuting witness, but without the knowledge
of the defendant. In a criminal action for obtaining money under false
pretenses, the trial court refused to allow the introduction of this
recording as evidence. The Commonwealth appealed to the court of
appeals, seeking a certification of law on the issue of admissibility.
Held: The recording is admissible. The recording of the conversation
is not a violation of the federal statutory prohibition of wiretapping,
and the federal rule excluding evidence obtained in violation of a
federal statute does not apply to the states. Commonwealth v.
Brinkley, 362 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1962).
As early as 1914, the United States Supreme Court held, in Weeks
v. United States,' that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure was not admissible in a federal court. The court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would defeat the fourth amendment's protec-
tion against such searches and seizures. But in the case of Olmstead
v. United States,2 the Supreme court refused to apply this doctrine to
a victim of wiretapping, holding that wiretapping is not an illegal
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In
response to this case, Congress enacted the Federal Communications
Act, which provides that no person shall intercept and divulge any
communication without the consent of the sender.3 Since the enact-
1232 U.S. 883 (1914).
2277 U.S. 438 (1928).
847 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
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